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For many, eleonore Stump’s Wandering in Darkness represents not only 
a major work on the problem of evil but a profoundly human and orthodox 
one as well.1 To give the briefest of summaries, Stump defends the claim 
that the purpose of life is eternal, loving communion with the divine and 
that, in His providence, God uses the suffering of His creatures to promote 
interpersonal closeness with Himself and to minimize distance with His 
creatures. Suffering is not a matter solely of what is absolutely necessary 
for human flourishing but also a matter of what one sets one’s heart on, 
one’s ‘desires of the heart’, and the good to which divine providence is 
ordered enfolds the desires of our hearts as well.
In what follows, I will bring out a theme that pervades the background 
of Stump’s book. She claims that the nature of suffering and the benefits 
that can defeat suffering each fail to be transparent to human beings. 
She uses this claim to negotiate a kind of truce with the proponents of 
sceptical theism and to defend her otherwise controversial claims about 
God’s commitment to giving us the desires of our heart. I will argue that 
a more nuanced view of transparency is called for than Stump utilizes 
in her book and that a more nuanced view has importance both for the 
purposes to which she puts her claims about transparency as well as 
the content of her theodicy.
I.
Stump says that we should ‘understand suffering in terms of what we care 
about’ (p. 10). Suffering is not identical with pain (pp. 5ff.) or the violation 
1 eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering 
(New York: oxford university Press, 2010).
168 ADAm GreeN
of one’s will (p. 8). Following Aristotle’s view that every human being 
seeks after eudaimonia, even if he or she doesn’t know what makes for 
eudaimonia, Stump says that we all care about our objective flourishing 
but, in addition to that, she points out that we also care about ‘what has 
great value for [us] in virtue of [our] commitment to it’ (p. 10). In other 
words, we also care about the desires of our heart whether or not those 
desires are related to objective flourishing. Suffering occurs whenever 
either one’s flourishing or one’s heart’s desires are damaged or undercut.
Stump points out that ‘[n]othing guarantees that a  person will be 
consciously aware of what constitutes his own flourishing or of what 
the desires of his heart are’ (p. 11). Furthermore, one cannot guarantee 
that one will recognize when either is fulfilled. by way of analogy, 
Stump draws our attention to the way in which someone who appears 
healthy may actually have cancer and someone who has gone through 
treatment for cancer might look very sick while being free of disease 
(p. 12). Valuing health does not imply that one can discern its presence. 
Stump goes so far as to suppose that someone could receive what he 
cares most about without recognizing that fact. Stump uses the example 
of Victor Klemperer who was passionately committed to writing an 
academic book on French literature which Klemperer thought would be 
very important (p. 12). His efforts were stymied by the repressions of 
the Nazis. Klemperer’s diaries, in which he vents his anguish at being 
deprived of his life’s work, would become highly regarded literary works 
themselves. Stump claims that the right way to view this case is that 
Klemperer received his heart’s desire, the desire to write a great book, 
but he was not aware of this fact.
Stump concludes that, since one can be ignorant about whether one 
is flourishing and whether one has one’s heart’s desire, ‘the account of 
suffering I have argued for here implies that a human being can suffer 
without knowing that she is suffering, and that she can think that she 
suffers when she does not.’ (p. 12) Stump recognizes that this claim 
will be counterintuitive. She argues that the counterintuitiveness arises 
from conflating pain and suffering (p. 5). Pain is often thought to be 
transparent, but suffering is not transparent.2 When one is in pain, one 
is aware that one is in pain. Stump never argues that the things that 
defeat pain are transparent, but it is not hard to argue that they have at 
2 It is worth noting that Stump repeatedly puts a reference in her footnotes to Timothy 
Williamson’s denial of the transparency of pain as well, cf. p. 625, n. 131.
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least a derived transparency. Since pain is transparent, one can often tell 
whether it is still there ‘just by looking’ as it were. Since suffering is not 
transparent, however, benefits that remove suffering will not have derived 
transparency. Thus, Stump takes it to be established that ‘neither suffering 
nor the benefits defeating suffering are transparent’ (p. 413), and, in 
the second half of her book, she makes clear that she thinks not being 
transparent is equivalent to being ‘opaque’ (pp. 373, 408, 409, 413, 468).
Stump’s claims about the transparency of suffering and its defeat show 
up in a number of places in her book. Notably, she uses her claim about 
transparency to maintain a nuanced relationship with sceptical theism. 
Sceptical theism is a position on the problem of evil that an increasing 
number of theists in academia are taking, according to which human 
beings are not in a position to tell whether a good God and the evils of 
this world could coexist.3 God is a being of another magnitude. As the 
bible says, ‘His ways are higher than our ways’ and ‘His ways are not our 
ways’ (Isa 55:8-9). Human beings, the sceptical theist maintains, are not 
in a position to tell what reasons such a being might have to allow evil 
anymore than an infant might understand why its mother consents to its 
having a painful medical treatment. Sceptical theism comes in stronger 
and weaker varieties. A  weaker version could claim, for instance, that 
the evils we find in the world are significant but insufficient evidence 
that God doesn’t exist, and a strong version could go so far as to claim 
that the evils of this world do not constitute any evidence whatsoever as 
to whether a good and loving God exists.
At first glance, Stump’s theodicy does not fit very well with the 
sceptical trend in theistic treatments of the problem of evil. She says a lot 
about what reasons a good and loving God has for allowing evils on the 
Christian story. moreover, she requires that God be in the business of 
defeating evils and these evils that need defeating are largely determined 
by what we care about. even worse, what we care about is partly a function 
of what we freely choose to care about and not simply a matter of what 
God has programmed us to care about. Whereas the ethos of sceptical 
theism is to stress the transcendence and ineffability of God, Stump’s 
theodicy stresses the desire of God to be intimate with us.
3 For an overview of sceptical theist positions, see Justin mcbrayer, ‘Skeptical Theism’, 
Philosophy Compass, 5(7) (2010), 1-13. The highest concentration of seminal papers 
on the topic can perhaps be found in The Evidential Argument from Evil, ed. by Daniel 
Howard-Snyder (bloomington: Indiana university Press, 2009).
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Despite the prima facie tension between Stump’s theodicy and 
sceptical theism, she thinks the two are complementary. Stump claims 
that sceptical theism can be ‘a  fallback position for theodicists’ such 
as herself (p. 15). The theodicist performs the equivalent of a  thought 
experiment that may, in fact, fail to prove anything about the actual 
world due to sceptical considerations while nonetheless being useful. 
moreover, insofar as it derives its content from revelation in the form of 
biblical source material, her theodicy is consistent with taking a sceptical 
approach to attempts to reconstruct God’s reasons for allowing evil apart 
from revelation (pp. 14-15).
These considerations alone might not be enough to assuage the 
sceptical theist, however. Thought experiments are judged successful or 
not based on human intuition. A human being must make a judgment 
about what she thinks is possible or plausible. A  sceptical theist will 
be inclined to deny that a  human being has any such power to judge 
possible worlds when it comes to the divine and evil. likewise, though 
sceptical theists are not likely to object to a distinction between revelation 
and natural reason, they will object to the idea that what is revealed in 
revelation is the sort of thing that human beings can measure against 
the evils of the world so as to judge whether or not the God as putatively 
revealed is likely to exist or not.
What does count as a  true peace-making move on Stump’s part, 
however, is her claim that ‘there is a much more mundane reason for 
being doubtful about our ability to discern the morally sufficient reason 
justifying any particular case of human suffering [than that provided 
by skeptical theism]’. And what reason is that? ‘[N]either the suffering 
nor the benefits that could defeat it are transparent to us.’ (p. 14) It is 
unsurprising that Stump spends much more space emphasizing this part 
of her view when comparing her view to sceptical theism than she 
spends on revelation or the status of theodical thought experiments. 
The transparency claim allows her to agree with the sceptical theist on 
his most basic conviction, that human beings aren’t in a position to tell 
that God doesn’t exist given the evils they experience. For, if one cannot 
tell who is suffering and whose suffering is defeated, one cannot reason 
from particular evils to the likelihood of God’s nonexistence.
Stump also uses transparency to defend her claim that God is in the 
business of giving us the desires of our heart. return to the example of 
Victor Klemperer. Klemperer seems to think that the desire of his heart 
is to write a great book about French literature. He is pained that the 
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ascent of the Nazis to power deprives him of his desire. If desires of 
the heart were transparent, then he would surely be right. He was being 
deprived of what he surely seems to care greatly about. Furthermore, 
Klemperer’s situation is by no means anomalous. It often happens that 
people don’t get what they appear to care the most about, even when 
such deprivation is not a consequence of some wrongful action on their 
part. every parent who’s lost a child, every victim of a debilitating and 
shameful illness, everyone who finds themselves bored and listless in life 
can bear witness to the universality of the suffering borne of caring about 
things that never happen or are taken away. The supposed existence of 
a superlatively great afterlife doesn’t make sense of why one must live day 
to day without the thing one wants most in this life.
The existence of the Klemperers of the world poses a  significant 
obstacle to a theodicy that wants to affirm not just that the righteous ‘get 
theirs in the end’, but that God is desirous of the closest intimacy with 
every human being here and now. As we know, Stump actually claims the 
case of Klemperer as an example of how God does providently work so as 
to provide the desires of the heart. Klemperer’s diary, in which he records 
his despair at not being able to produce his book, becomes a great work 
of literature itself. Stump says,
Presumably, if Klemperer had been offered the choice of writing a book 
that added to the existing secondary literature on a  limited period in 
French literary history or writing a  book that is one of the greatest 
German works of any kind, he would have wanted the latter much more 
than the former; and he would have recognized the desire for the latter 
as a version of the desire for the former. (p. 436)
These are bold claims about the true nature of Klemperer’s desires, 
but notice that they would make no sense if the nature of Klemperer’s 
suffering and the necessary means of defeating it were transparent. If 
Klemperer’s desire was transparent, we would have no choice but to 
accept that Klemperer suffers the loss of a desire of his heart that is not 
defeated. The same would hold for the myriad other cases of frustrated 
desire. If the desires of the heart and their fulfilment are not transparent, 
this creates the possibility that God really is in the business of providing 
our hearts’ desires despite the prevalence of people who seem deprived 
of those desires for no good reason.4
4 Stump also uses her claims about transparency to block an objection having to do 
with the ethical implications of her theodicy (pp. 412-413) as well as to defend limiting 
her treatment of evil to fully functional adults (p. 477).
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II.
Having explicated Stump’s claims about the lack of transparency of one’s 
suffering and the benefits that could defeat that suffering, this section 
will show that transparency is not quite what Stump makes it out to be.
Transparency is a  degreed property. Something can be more 
transparent or less, and more opaque or less. one does sometimes speak 
as if transparency or opacity are not degreed. one might assert without 
qualification that a piece of obsidian is opaque or that a windowpane is 
transparent. Nevertheless, it is equally sensible to ask how transparent 
something is. When used without qualification, it is often understood that 
there is some standard against which something counts as transparent or 
opaque. For a piece of glass, the key may be whether one can see through 
it. For a comment, it may be whether one can discern what the comment 
means without having to think much about it. The degreed nature of 
transparency is only drawn attention to when it makes some practical 
difference. If the queen is visiting, it might matter how transparent the 
glass is and whether a little more polish might make it more so. likewise, 
if one wants to communicate a message to one’s spouse and not one’s 
child, one will pay attention to just how opaque one’s comment is.
In the context of Stump’s work, it is worthy of note that she makes 
rather extensive claims about what is not transparent, but it is not 
plausible that things like suffering and desire are completely opaque 
either, certainly not in normal cases. It is one thing to claim that one can 
be wrong about what one truly cares about, or for one to claim that it is 
possible for one not to know what it is that one desires. It is quite another 
to claim that one has no clue. In other words, it does not follow from 
something’s not being transparent to one that one’s subjective perception 
of the matter does not constrain what may be claimed about it. A lack of 
transparency of even a  high degree does not entail that something is 
completely opaque.
Suppose, for instance, that Tommy the teenager thinks he’s in love 
with betty, the school nurse. It could well be that whether Tommy is 
really in love with betty is not transparent to Tommy. In fact, let us 
suppose that Tommy is not really in love but instead has a  youthful 
crush that falls short of love for some reason. Despite his confusion on 
the question of whether or not he loves betty, the nature of his attitude 
toward betty is not completely opaque to Tommy. If Freddy the friendly 
neighbourhood Freudian gives Tommy impressive sounding reasons for 
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thinking Tommy actually hates betty, Tommy might well trump Freddy’s 
assertions on the basis of Tommy’s awareness of his own internal states. 
Tommy tells Freddy that he knows that Freddy is wrong, and Tommy 
does know this. The exact nature of Tommy’s feeling is not transparent to 
him, but he has some grasp of what his feelings are and what they are not.
Thus, one complication for Stump’s account is that one cannot assume 
that our suffering, our cares, our desires, and so on are opaque, even if 
we accept that they are not transparent. At best, they may be opaque 
relative to some standard. one wonders, however, what the standard is 
against which Stump judges various items to be not transparent and thus 
opaque. one can return to the contrast between pain and suffering to 
make progress here. one can tell whether one is in pain ‘just by looking’ 
as it were. Perhaps the claim is that one cannot tell by looking exactly 
what one desires or suffers and, thus, that suffering and its defeaters 
aren’t transparent in whatever way that pain is.
one finds, upon closer inspection, that the comparison between pain 
and states related to suffering is more complicated than it may at first 
appear. No doubt one cannot fail to recognize one’s pain for what it is 
when the pain is quite strong, one is undistracted, and the task at hand 
does not require one to identify the specific kind of pain or its cause. 
relax any of these parameters, however, and the degree of transparency 
goes down. A slight pain to which one is not paying attention may fail to 
be identified at all or be mistaken for an itch. Someone with a motivation 
to believe that he is not in pain may be able to fool himself into believing 
that he is not so long as the pain is not of so acute or chronic a kind as to 
wear out his delusions. Furthermore, it may be transparent to one that 
one is in pain even though one cannot identify what kind of pain one is 
experiencing, cannot reliably compare that pain with other kinds of pain, 
or makes other mistakes about the pain’s properties. These complications 
regarding pain narrow the gap between the transparency of pain and the 
lack of transparency of suffering and desire.
Just as pain is not completely transparent, so desire is not completely 
opaque. No doubt there are times when we make mistakes about 
what exactly it is that we care about or desire. We might not be able to 
tell exactly how much we care about something or exactly why we care 
about something. being in the dark on some aspects of conative states is 
completely consistent with there being other features that are transparent. 
To return to the example of Tommy the teenager, it surely seems that 
there are a number of things that can be transparent to Tommy such as 
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that he has a desire, that the object of this desire is betty, and that the 
desire is of the romantic ilk. Desire contrasts with pain not in whether 
it is transparent but rather in how and to what extent it is transparent.
Instead of labelling types of mental state as transparent or opaque, it 
would be more apt to say that any given internal state has a transparency 
profile. The pain that one feels in one’s toe upon stubbing it on the door 
jam scores high in the transparency of its cause and of the scope of the 
pain. The pattern of one’s experience is such that the sudden onset of that 
kind of pain in those circumstances makes both the extent and the cause 
of the pain immediately apparent. The pain that comes from stubbing 
a toe may score high in the transparency of these features while scoring 
low in one’s ability to know what ‘defeats’ the injury. The pain may go 
away gradually without one’s being aware of the healing process internal 
to the toe. Thus, the cause and location of the pain is highly transparent 
for toe-stubbing, but the healing of the pain is more opaque. In contrast, 
it may be completely opaque to someone suffering from anxiety what the 
scope and cause of the anxiety is in a case where the defeat of the anxiety 
is transparent. Perhaps taking a certain medication or talking to one’s 
child on the phone allays the anxiety in a way that is transparent despite 
the fact that the cause and scope of the anxiety had been fairly opaque.
The same holds true of our desires and what we care about. If mary 
finds herself with a desire to have pecan praline ice cream, then some 
features of the desire may be more transparent and others may be more 
opaque. Perhaps she has no idea why she desires some ice cream at this 
particular time, but she might be aware that she values this ice cream 
because it reminds her of her mother. The desire for pecan praline ice 
cream may be less transparent to her the weaker the desire is and more 
clear as the desire increases in strength. In contrast, mary’s desire that 
her father give his toolkit to her instead of her brother might have a very 
different transparency profile. This desire might be more transparent 
to her if it is only a desire of moderate strength. She might be bemused to 
find that she really wants to get that toolkit and really wants her brother 
not to get it. The desire might become more opaque in some ways as this 
desire increases in strength. Perhaps when she feels the desire strongly 
she will lose conscious access to the contrastive nature of the desire, not 
being aware that she wants to best her brother in her father’s attentions 
in the matter of the toolkit.
Consequently, the important question for Stump’s theodicy is not 
whether suffering and the benefits that defeat it are completely transparent. 
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Precious little is completely transparent. The important question rather 
is whether there are any general trends in the transparency profiles of 
suffering and defeaters of suffering that are relevant to Stump’s project. 
With this background, let us take another look at Stump’s theodicy and 
the purposes to which Stump puts her claims about transparency in the 
following two sections.
III.
In this section, I will argue that a nuanced version of transparency fits 
better into the worldview that forms the backdrop for Stump’s theodicy.
For Aquinas and for Stump, goodness, truth, beauty, and being are 
all interconnected. In fact, they are all different ways for talking about 
the same thing.5 beauty, for instance, is goodness made perceptible.6 The 
growth of a human being, the kind of growth that can defeat suffering, 
is a  growth in integration around the good. on the assumption that 
one cannot have one of the transcendentals without having the others, 
however, growth in goodness must also be growth in truth and beauty. 
The growth of a  human being in integration around the good is one 
from a fragmentation of mind and will into a unified whole. because of 
the intimate connections between these transcendentals and because 
both truth and beauty have epistemic import, the telos of a  human 
being includes a  journey of mind as well as heart. one would expect 
the fragmentation of a soul to affect what truths one can reach and what 
goodness one is able to see.
It may be logically possible for a soul to go directly from a state of 
deep fragmentation to a state of complete union with God and thus with 
Goodness. Some have thought that such a  transition will occur upon 
entrance into heaven. It seems undeniable, however, that this is not the 
case in this world. Growth in goodness is a  gradual and treacherous 
affair. one would expect the epistemic dimensions of this journey to be 
gradual as well. A degreed notion of transparency fits neatly into this 
schema. There may be points on the journey of life when whole clusters of 
one’s experience make sense for the first time where they were hopelessly 
5 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Truth, J. mcGlynn (tr.) (Chicago: 
H. regenery Co., 1952), 1.1.
6 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q.5, a.4 <www.newadvent.org/summa> 
[accessed April 5, 2012].
176 ADAm GreeN
opaque previously. These moments are the exceptions, however. For the 
most part, clarity of perspective is something that comes on gradually. 
If this was the only advance that a more nuanced view of transparency 
brought, the gain might not be worth the effort to bring it to attention. 
more can be said, however.
An important question to ask is whether Stump’s Thomistic theodicy 
has any implications for the transparency profiles of desires, beliefs 
about the satisfaction of our desires, and the like. Stump’s picture of 
the psychological structure of the soul borrows heavily from Harry 
Frankfurt (cf. p. 132). She stresses that one’s desires are hierarchical. The 
desires of the heart just are those desires that are most central to the web 
of one’s desires. on Stump’s account, however, human beings are deeply 
divided creatures. This inner alienation should show up in the hierarchy 
of one’s desires. There are fault lines in the soul, and these fault lines 
should intersect the desires of the heart.
The brokenness of the human condition should manifest itself most 
profoundly within the desires of the heart because, from a  Thomistic 
perspective, the human condition is one in which the soul is disordered. It 
is not the case that human beings desire things that should not be desired 
at all so much as that the hierarchy of desire fails to correspond to the 
hierarchy of goods that exist. The desires of the heart are, by definition, 
those desires most central and deeply embedded within the hierarchy 
of desire. Thus, these are the desires that are meant to correspond to the 
greatest goods. A failure of the desires of the heart to be properly ordered, 
then, would constitute an alienation from goodness more radical than 
a lack of proper order outside of this cluster of desires. on the Christian 
story, the human condition is one of just such a radical alienation from 
God and, thus, from goodness.
The structure of the soul and the way the human condition manifests 
itself within that structure implies that there are two competing 
considerations that should determine the transparency profile of our 
desires. one consideration is proximity to the centre of the web of desire; 
the other is proximity to fault lines within the soul. If all other things are 
equal, one would expect desires that are closer to the centre of the web 
to have enhanced transparency in many respects. They will command 
a greater portion of the intellect’s attention due to their relative priority. 
The increased attention will be both quantitative and qualitative. 
Desires at the centre of one’s web of desires should be more likely to be 
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triggered in a variety of circumstances. one should also expect desires 
of higher priority to be felt more strongly in general, with more vivid 
phenomenology. because of the fundamentality of these desires within 
one’s value hierarchy, one would expect that more central desires will 
have a cluster of peripheral desires that can indirectly activate the more 
central desire but more peripheral desires will less regularly be activated 
by a cluster of more central desires.
moreover, when a heart’s desire is appropriately aimed at a good of 
sufficient weight, the intellect will be attending to a source of more truth 
and more perceptible goodness given the nature of transcendentals. The 
structure of the soul, then, should be such that, all other things being equal, 
transparency should be generally enhanced with increasing proximity to 
the centre of the web of desire, and it should decrease the farther away 
from the centre a desire is. All other things are not equal, however.
Proximity to a fault line in the soul should increase opacity. A division 
of the soul decreases the being, goodness, truth, and beauty in that part 
of the soul. The order in the soul fails to correspond to the order of 
objective goods, and, when it does so, one should find corresponding 
impairments in one’s grasp of truth and one’s perception of the good.7 
To the extent that a desire is lodged in a more orderly part of the soul, 
the opacity caused by internal division will decrease relative to desires 
in less orderly parts of the soul. once again, however, not all things are 
equal. The less divided parts of the soul are likely to be those parts of the 
soul on the outside of the web of desire, where desires are less inherently 
transparent under normal conditions.
These two competing considerations, proximity to the centre of the 
web of desire and proximity to divisions in the soul, should lead us to 
expect the transparency profiles of desires at different points of the web 
of desire to differ markedly in their properties. Desires that are farther 
from the centre should have more stable profiles, tending to score 
similarly on different dimensions of transparency. In general, the more 
attention one of these desires is given, the more transparent it should 
7 one might here think I am conflating the beauty of oneself with the beauty of the 
object of cognition. beauty is goodness made perceptible, so a more beautiful mind will 
have more perceivable goodness. one might object, however, that it does not follow that 
the mind will perceive more goodness. The objector, however, forgets that the mind itself 
is the object of concern in the discussion of transparency. because self-knowledge is at 
the fore here, an increase in the beauty of the mind is relevant to an increase in one’s 
ability to perceive that beauty.
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become because the primary obstacle to transparency for such a desire is 
distance from the centre of one’s attentions.
In contrast, a  desire of the heart in a  fallen human being should 
have a  very uneven transparency profile because its position near the 
centre of the web of desire increases transparency while its proximity 
to the greatest divisions in the soul increases opacity and alienation 
from the truth. because internal division is not complete, some things 
about these desires should have a high degree of transparency where the 
transparency lent to a desire by its position in the web is not defeated by 
internal division. other aspects of the desire should be disproportionately 
opaque. A  desire of the heart becoming stronger will not necessarily 
increase its transparency on balance. rather, one would expect greater 
attention to exacerbate its uneven profile, heightening the transparency 
of parts of the desire while putting strain on the divisions of mind and 
will to which the desire is attached.
one can imagine the differences in these two kinds of desires with 
the following analogy. Imagine a  field covered by magnets with more 
powerful magnets in the centre of the field and less powerful ones near 
the edges of the field. The more powerful magnets in the centre of the 
field have been fused to magnets with opposite orientations. A south-
north oriented magnet in the periphery would be by itself, but a more 
powerful south-north magnet in the centre of the field will be fused with 
a north-south magnet. When one passes a lodestone over the periphery 
of the field, the magnets tend to move weakly but uniformly due to their 
stable orientation and limited power. When the lodestone passes over 
the centre of the field, the magnets move strongly but unpredictably due 
to their unstable orientation and greater power. The difference between 
the relatively stable magnets on the periphery of the field and the more 
volatile magnets in the centre of the field is analogous to the way that 
position in the web of desire should affect the transparency profile of 
a desire given Stump’s Thomistic metaphysics and Frankfurtian picture 
of psychic organization.
Position in the web of desire, then, should correspond with significant 
differences in the transparency profile of a desire. These differences lead 
to differences in how changes to the web of desire affect the transparency 
profiles of individual desires. Peripheral desires are less likely to change 
significantly in transparency as a result of one’s overall growth in goodness 
unless growth in goodness also happens to move that desire deeper into 
the web. Presumably, more peripheral desires exist in more stable parts 
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of the web, and the determining factor in their transparency profile is 
proximity to the centre of the web rather than proximity to divisions in the 
soul. In contrast, growth in goodness should affect exactly what inhibits 
the transparency of desires of the heart. To the extent that divisions 
in the soul heal, a desire of the heart should become more transparent in 
general and also acquire a more stable transparency profile.
This more nuanced perspective on transparency accords well with 
the biblical stories that Stump uses to support and fill out her position. 
Take, for instance, chapter twelve of Stump’s book on mary of bethany 
(pp. 308-368).
mary, the sister of lazarus, feels that she has lost her heart’s desire 
when lazarus dies and Jesus fails to show up in time to save her brother. 
It is transparent to mary early in the story that being separated from 
lazarus is something that goes against the desires of her heart. It is 
transparent to mary that Jesus could have kept her brother from dying, 
and it might be transparent to mary that she wants Jesus to save her 
brother at least partly out of love of her. The story would not make sense 
unless mary has a clear, unmistakable grasp of some of what she desires. 
The journey that mary goes through in regaining her brother allows 
her to have the desires of her heart at a deeper level. It does not do so, 
however, in a way disconnected from mary’s perspective. What explains 
why we find mary at Jesus’ feet later in the story is the very fact that 
who Jesus is and how he relates to her and her desires has become more 
vivid to her than it was before lazarus’ illness. There are things that were 
opaque to her that have become clear. She knows this and responds out 
of love and gratitude.
mutatis mutandis, the very same points hold of the stories of Samson, 
Abraham, and Job that Stump utilizes. The story of each of them only 
makes sense if one draws attention to the interplay of both transparency 
and opacity early in the story. each story is one of coming to a place of 
increased transparency at the end of the story, not simply acquiescence 
in the face of unilateral opacity. Thus, I  take it that a  nuanced view 
of transparency accords better with both the ‘Dominican’ and the 
‘Franciscan’ parts of Stump’s book than a  black and white account of 
transparency. The nuanced account fits better and might even logically 
follow from a  Thomistic-Frankfurtian account of the divided and 
hierarchical soul. And the biblical stories that are at the heart of her 
project, such as the story of mary, can be made better sense of with 
a nuanced view on which the selective transparency of each character’s 
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perspective at the beginning of the story blossoms into greater trans-
parency by the end of the story.
Having made the case for amending Stump’s position with a nuanced 
view of transparency, let us turn to the uses to which Stump had put her 
own claims on the topic.
IV.
As previously discussed, one use to which Stump puts her claims about 
transparency is diffusing tensions between sceptical theism and her 
theodicy. The sceptical theist wants to deny that we are in a position to 
assess the likelihood that God exists given the evils of this world. Stump 
declares some sympathy with this perspective, but she wants to make 
room for making substantive claims regarding what justifying reasons 
God actually has on the Christian story. Stump appeals to the opacity 
of one’s suffering and defeaters of that suffering to preserve the sceptical 
theist’s core conviction without thereby undercutting the possibility of 
giving a general account of some of God’s reasons for allowing evil.
moving to the more nuanced perspective on transparency would 
make the relationship between Stump’s Thomistic theodicy and sceptical 
theism trickier. If it is not the case that suffering and the defeat of 
suffering is completely opaque, then one can be in a position to make 
some judgments about what evils the world contains and which ones 
might be defeated. If one can make some judgments about what evils are 
in the world and which ones might be defeated, then one can gather at 
least some evidence that surely seems relevant to the question of whether 
a good God could exist. It would not follow that one is in a position to 
gather sufficient evidence to be warranted in ruling out God’s existence, 
but even this much of a concession to the autonomy of human reason 
would rub many sceptical theists the wrong way.
The dialectical advantage of a view on which transparency is an all or 
nothing affair is that one can use a lack of transparency as an impermeable 
barrier for one’s opponent. If the form of the dialectic is such that one’s 
opponent is attacking one’s position, then having the ability to remove 
from the debate the evidence one’s opponent wants to use is an especially 
useful defensive weapon. If suffering and its defeaters are completely 
opaque, then there is no room for the proponent of the argument from 
evil to haggle over the probability that God exists. The anti-theist loses 
the evidence needed to make an argument.
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Surely, however, gaining such an advantage over the anti-theist 
would be a pyrrhic victory. The problem of evil is a problem not because 
it is possible to posit something to which we have no access that is 
inconsistent with God’s existence. rather, the problem is that we are 
intimately acquainted with evil, and we are aware that its existence is in 
tension with the claim that a good and loving God exists. In order to have 
the knowledge that generates the problem in the first place, suffering 
can’t be something that’s opaque to us, not completely. Stump opens her 
book with the statement that only ‘the most naïve or tendentious among 
us would deny the extent and intensity of suffering in the world’ (p. 3). If 
suffering were opaque, however, there would be no basis for this claim. 
The fact that we all know the claim to be true should lead one to reject 
the opacity of suffering.
Adopting a nuanced perspective on transparency would not require 
denying that the sceptical theist has a point, however. on the enhanced 
version of Stump’s theodicy developed in the previous section, there is 
a  reason to expect systematic obstacles to gaining a  full and balanced 
perspective on the exact nature of one’s suffering. The greater someone 
suffers from division in her soul, the more limited her perspective on 
what is happening to her. It is worth remembering, however, that on the 
account developed here, greater suffering should correlate with a greater 
increase in clarity and insight should the divisions within the soul that 
cause that suffering be healed. In fact, unlike a  position on which no 
humans are in a position to judge whether God and evil could co-exist, 
the nuanced view of transparency in conjunction with Stump’s theodicy 
implies that some are in a good position to make this judgment, namely, 
those who have come through their sufferings much more integrated 
around the good. They, at least, are in a much better position to make 
these judgments than the rest of us. Surely, this result is more in harmony 
with Stump’s readings of the biblical stories than a blanket denial of the 
aptness of human cognition for making progress on such matters.
regarding Stump’s second application of transparency, adopting 
a nuanced view of transparency would significantly restrict claims that 
the desires of someone’s heart could be satisfied without one’s awareness 
that this has happened. This restriction comes from two directions, one 
obvious and one less obvious. The more obvious consideration is that, 
on the nuanced view, some features of the desires of one’s heart tend to 
be transparent. This opens up the possibility, for example, that Victor 
Klemperer really, really knew that what he desired to do was to write 
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a book on French literature. one might tell Klemperer about what will 
happen to his diaries only to have him deny that this had anything to do 
with what he wanted, and, on the nuanced view of transparency, it’s not 
unlikely that he is in a privileged epistemic position on the matter.
on a more general level, on the nuanced view of transparency, one 
has to take people’s perspective on their desires more seriously than if the 
desires of the heart are all simply opaque to the people who have them. 
Attempting to explain away the heartbreak of frustrated desire by claiming 
that God could have secretly provided the desires of the sufferer’s heart 
becomes a strategy of limited utility. This point accords well with Stump’s 
biblical source material. Samson, Job, Abraham, and mary all have 
problems of perspective early in their stories, but their problems do not 
amount to ignorance of the ways God has actually provided their heart’s 
desire. Actually, they know that they are without their heart’s desires early 
in the story, and, when God has satisfied those desires, they know it. This 
point brings us to the second and more subtle consideration.
many of the desires of the heart should be such that the satisfaction 
of those desires is conditional upon some measure of healing in the 
soul. That inner healing, however, enhances one’s epistemic position. As 
I argued in the last section, healing comes with increased transparency. 
Consequently, a  soul that receives a  desire of the heart should be in 
an improved epistemic position in relation to the status of that desire. 
Desires of the heart are supposed to take greater goods as objects. The 
greater the good, however, the more healing is necessary in order to 
appropriate that good. It is plausible that whatever divisions in the 
soul affect a desire of the heart at least overlap with the inner wounds 
that need healing in order for that desire to be fulfilled. because the 
fulfilment of the desires of the heart should be correlated with growth 
in the transparency of these desires, one should expect that failures 
to recognize the genuine fulfilment of a desire of the heart should not 
often arise due to failures of self-knowledge. one might fail to know 
that a desire has been fulfilled for some other, extrinsic reason, but self-
knowledge should not be the culprit.
one consequence of amending Stump’s account in the manner I am 
recommending is that it opens up the possibility that the world is full of 
undefeated suffering from heartbreak. many people suffer unfulfilled and 
deeply felt desires. If one cannot claim that these people simply have no 
epistemic access to whether or not their desires are fulfilled, then one is left 
with the question of what to do with genuine evidence for a vast amount 
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of undefeated heartbreak. This is a significant cost, though it would not 
necessarily follow that such heartbreak makes belief in God untenable.
What might follow is that the first half of the psalmist’s famous claim 
is very important. The psalmist says, ‘Delight yourself in the lord and 
He will give you the desires of your heart.’ (Psalm 37:4) becoming more 
integrated around goodness is a normal part of what is required to receive 
the desires of one’s heart. This might be partly because it changes the 
desires of one’s heart, but another reason is that inner healing is normally 
necessary to God’s fulfilling one’s deepest desires. Perhaps the prevalence 
of a  lack of internal integration both in oneself and in others who are 
relevant to one’s desires necessitates that God allow so much unresolved 
heartbreak in the here and now. No doubt developing the view in this 
way would be unpalatable to many, seeming to blame the heartbroken 
for their failing to receive what they desire or restricting what they may 
receive now due to the brokenness of others. Nonetheless, evolving the 
view in this way would appear to be faithful to the traditional Christian 
depiction of the human condition.
by way of conclusion, the characters in the biblical narratives Stump 
utilizes receive their heart’s desire in a deeper way than they could have 
prior to an experience in which the object of desire seems to be taken 
from them. Why would this be if one’s desires were opaque? How would 
almost losing one’s deepest desire change one in the requisite way if that 
desire were opaque to one? I  submit that it would not and could not. 
What actually happens in these stories is that the selective transparency 
of the characters’ desires puts them in an uncomfortable half-light. As 
the story progresses, they find themselves moved towards the light, 
which comes with a greater ability to possess what they were searching 
for in the half-light. It is very important to recognize that half-light is 
not the light, but wandering in the half-light is also very different from 
wandering in total darkness.
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